Foreign Minister to Missions in Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium
The Foreign Minister to the Missions in Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy, vol. V, p.11. TOP SECRET
BERLIN, March 5, 1936. e.o. II R 271 Ang.I. [RM 178 Ang. I]
1) The Fuehrer and Chancellor intends to summon the Reichstag to meet on March 7 at twelve noon (Central European Time), to proclaim, publicly and with reference to the Alliance between France and the Soviet Union, the restoration of German sovereignty in the demilitarised Rhineland zone. This restoration of German sovereignty will be made known to the other signatories of the Locarno Rhine Pact simultaneously through diplomatic channels. I would therefore request you personally to convey the enclosed Memorandum on Saturday morning to the Government to which you are accredited, that is to say, to the Foreign Minister himself or to his deputy. If it should prove impossible to communicate it yourself on Saturday morning, you should send the Memorandum at that time to the Foreign Ministry with a short accompanying note to the effect that you have been instructed by your Government to transmit to the Government to which you are accredited the enclosed Memorandum on the effects of the Alliance between France and the Soviet Union on the Locarno Rhine Pact. You should not enclose a translation of the Memorandum.
2) The Memorandum will also be conveyed on Saturday morning to the Governments in Warsaw, Prague, and the Hague, for their information.
3) It is intended to signalise the restoration of sovereignty in the Rhineland zone during the course of Saturday by the entry of some small Wehrmacht contingents.
4) If you communicate the Memorandum personally I would request you to elucidate the main points contained in it along the following lines: The factual grounds for the Reich Government's decision are briefly summarised in the Memorandum itself. That the Rhine Pact entailed respecting the demilitarisation provisions could from the first only be regarded as unjustifiable discrimination against Germany. Nevertheless, as the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated in his great Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, the present Reich Government too would have been prepared to accept this anomaly if France, for her part, had not violated the Rhine Pact and created an entirely new situation. As a result of the Franco-Soviet Alliance, and the parallel Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union brought about by this Alliance, the political and military position of Germany has markedly deteriorated. We are, therefore, forced to offset this deterioration to some extent at least by extending our defensive possibilities in the Rhineland. You should, in particular, point out that, through the offer of a treaty which is contained in the latter part of the Memorandum, we are, in spite of the breach of treaty of which we assert France to be guilty, politically upholding the truly essential basic principles of the Rhine Pact and are giving them added force through our agreement to an air pact and to the inclusion of the Netherlands in the treaty system. The treaty offered by us in consequence actually the old Rhine Pact adjusted to the present situation. If the other side should ask whether our offer of a treaty, especially the offer of a German-French undertaking to renounce war, is to be interpreted to mean that France will still be able to maintain her existing alliances, including the treaty with the Soviet Union, you may reply that in your personal opinion the answer in the affirmative, since the Memorandum explicitly speaks of adjusting the basic principles of the Rhine Pact to the present situation, and since the purpose of Germany's action is obviously to obtain an equivalent to the conclusion of the new Franco-Soviet Alliance by being released from the demilitarisation clauses. Even more important than the willingness to co-operate shown by our offer of a treaty is the declaration of our readiness to return to the League of Nations. We expect the other nations to appreciate duly the importance of this decision, and to acknowledge the contribution, which Germany is thus making to a detente . Our decision should be valued the more highly since, in taking it, we are refraining from making the solution of other important problems - such as the colonial question and the question of the German rivers - conditions for our return to the League of Nations. Naturally, we are not in point of fact abandoning our position on these questions. The fact that we are not insisting on their solution before our return to the League of Nations is, however, a very important step. The other Powers may now consider that something which they have always described as one of the most important aims of European policy, namely, that the Third Reich should accede to the concept of collective security embodied in the Geneva institution, has been achieved. We shall, of course, have to expect the expostulation that what is objectionable in our action lies in the unilateral denunciation of a pact, which had been freely accepted, and in the creation of a fait accompli . To this you should reply, firstly, that in our view it was France who began it with her unilateral action over her new alliance and that we have been continually inviting attention to this since May of last year. It should, further, be remembered that, in view of all our experiences in recent years, and particularly in view of the course, which the disarmament negotiations took, we could not have any hopes of success if we tried, by means of negotiation, to induce France to relinquish the demilitarisation clauses. Our standpoint in principle would also have been prejudiced if we had made our right to reoccupy the Rhineland dependent on France's consent being obtained by means of negotiation. Finally, we must reckon with the possibility of an extension of the new French alliance system and of its being supplemented by a Rumanian-Soviet pact, as a result of which Germany's political and military position would further deteriorate. In view of the whole development of French policy, we cannot be expected passively and for an indefinite period to watch our military situation deteriorating and to refrain from making use of the defensive possibilities of our whole territory.
5) If the other side should refer to the possibility, already mentioned by Flandin in his speech in the Chamber, of submitting the German-French dispute to the Hague Court of Justice for decision, you should say that in your view, such a step would be pointless and would certainly not help to ease the situation. For one thing it is, even on legal grounds, very doubtful, to say the least, whether a question such as the interpretation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations could be brought before the Hague Court of Justice at all. Quite apart from this, the Court could never settle the political side of the question, on which, together with the legal aspect, Germany has always laid primary stress.
6) For your personal information I would draw attention to the following points. Even on the basis of the French view that the new Alliance is compatible with the Rhine Pact, the entry of German Wehrmacht contingents can by no means be regarded as a flagrant breach of the demilitarisation provisions in the sense of Article 2, paragraph 2, subsection 1, and of Article 4, subsection 3 of the Rhine Pact, with the effect of allowing France to react immediately by taking military counter-action assisted by Britain and Italy. For such an immediate counter-action would, even on the basis of the French view, be possible only if the alleged German action against the demilitarisation provisions constituted an unprovoked act of aggression, and if, as a result of the concentration of armed forces in the demilitarised zone, immediate action became necessary. There can, of course, be no question of this in the case of the peaceful entry of German battalions (for your information: and of some air force and anti-aircraft formations) to their new garrisons. From the French point of view it would, therefore, only be possible to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 4, subsection 1 of the Rhine Pact. You should, naturally, only go more closely into these provisions under the Rhine Pact if the other side should, of their own accord, mention the possibility of French counter-action. If the objection should be raised that the Reich Government should at least have waited till the Franco-Soviet Pact was ratified, you should reply that on February 28 the French Chamber accepted the Pact by 353 votes to 164, with 47 abstentions, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate accepted it on March 4 by 19 votes to 4, with 7 abstentions. There could therefore no longer be any doubt as to the result of the vote of the Senate in plenary session. (Addition for London only:)
7) Vis-a-vis Mr. Eden or his deputy, you should emphasise particularly that the Reich Government's decision to declare themselves prepared to return to the League of Nations was not an easy one, and that the desire to meet as far as possible the British Government's policy, which has become so closely connected with the League of Nations, was a consideration of no small weight. We hope that we have thus given the British Government an opportunity effectually to counteract a possible tendency in France to react rashly to our step. We are of course aware, and regret, that the British Government, by their approval of the French reply to our Memorandum of May 25 of last year, have in a way committed themselves to the French thesis; this should not, however, prevent them from doing justice to our political views now. They should not forget that our offers now provide an opportunity of taking a decisive step towards the consolidation of European policy. If this chance were to be let slip, or if the other Powers were to take our action as cause for forming a united front against Germany, then the whole of European politics would for a long time to come be subjected to a serious strain. We are convinced that the British Government are in a position to prevent this in the general interests of Europe. (Addition for Rome only:)
7) Vis-a-vis Signor Mussolini, you should also emphasise that our readiness to return to the League of Nations will of course in no way alter our previous attitude to the Abyssinian question. If the other Powers take up our offer of a treaty, the ensuing negotiations will certainly take a long time. It is therefore to he expected that our return to Geneva will only take place at a time when the Abyssinian question will already have been solved. In view of the attitude, which Signor Mussolini revealed in his recent conversations with you, we hope that we may count on him to exert his influence towards a peaceful and reasonable treatment of the question brought up by our action. If we declare the Locarno Rhine Pact to be broken and therefore finished with, Italy will, as a result, acquire a valuable trump card, in as much as the fresh settlement of the Western problem, which we have offered the other Powers, depends on her consent as well. (For all four dispatches:) It is not at present intended to publish the enclosed Memorandum, but the right to publish it is of course reserved. You should report at once by telegram on the reception accorded to your demarche .
